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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-PRIVILEGE AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION-DANGER 
OF PROSECUTION IN OTHER JuRISDICTIONs-Defendant, a witness called by the 
New Hampshire attorney general in an investigation of subversive activi-
ties, was granted statutory immunity in New Hampshire from criminal 
-prosecution which might arise from his testimony1 and was ordered to 
testify. Since any disclosures would create serious danger-of prosecution by 
the United States and Massachusetts, whose agencies were also investigating 
.his activities, defendant refused to testify despite the grant of immunity, 
-invoking the privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed l>y the state 
·constitution.2 He was found guilty of contempt,3 subject to his exceptions 
regarding the constitutionality of the immunity statute. On hearing before 
the _state supreme court, held, exceptions overruled, one justice dissenting. 
The constitutional privilege may be invoked only if there is danger of 
prosecution within the state. Since this danger is removed by the grant of 
immunity, the immunity statute, being as broad as the privilege, is constitu-
tional. Wyman v. De Gregory, (N.H. 1957) 137 A. (2d) 512. 
The privilege against self-incrimination embodied in the Fifth Amend-
ment4 may. be invoked by a witness in federal proceedings. Although the 
Constitution does not require the states to recognize this privilege,5 a similar 
·provision is incorporated in the constitutions of forty-six states.6 This does 
-not, however, guarantee an absolute right to silence,7 and a witness may be 
compelled to testify if immunity from prosecution as broad as the protec-
.tion secured by the privilege is granted.8 Whether the privilege exists when 
1 N.H. Laws (1955), c. 312. 
2 N.H. CoNsr., pt. I, art. 15. "No subject shall ... -be compelled to accuse or furnish 
evidence against .himself." 
s For prior proceedings in this case, see Wyman v. De Gregory, 100 N.H. 163, 121 A. 
·(2d) 805 (1956), committal to jail for contempt suspended and stayed 100 N.H. 513, 132 A. 
(2d) 133 (1957), assigned for reargument 101 N.H. 82, 133 A. (2d) 787 (1957). 
4 U.S. CoNsr., Amend. V. 
5 The Fifth Amendment is not directly applicable to the states. Barron v. Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore, 7 Pet. (32 U.S.) 243 (1833). Nor is it indirectly applicable 
by incorporation in the "privileges or immunities" or "due process" clauses of the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908); Adamson v. 
California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). See Knapp v. Schweitzer, 2 N,Y. (2d) 975, 142 N.E. (2d) 
649 (1957), cert. granted 355 U.S. 804 (1957), argued March 6 and IO, 1958, 26 U.S. LAW 
WEEK 3271 (1958), on the question whether the Fifth Amendment is applicable before 
a state grand jury when testimony would reveal a federal crime. See generally Fairman, 
"Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights," 2 STAN. L. REv. 5 
(1949); Morrison, "Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights," 
2 STAN. L. REv. 140 (1949). 
. 6 See 8 W1c11roRE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2252, n. 3 (1940), setting forth the state constitu-
tional provisions. The remaining two states also recognize the privilege. Iowa recognizes 
it as part of "due process" in the state constitution. State v. Height, 117 Iowa 650, 91 
N.W. 935 (1902). New Jersey recognizes it as part of the common law. State v. Zdanowicz, 
69 N.JL. 619, 55 A. 743 (1903). 
7 Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). 
B Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892). See 118 AL.R. 602 (1939); 53 AL.R. 
(2d) 1030 (1957). See also 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 3d ed., §2281, n. 11 (1940), setting forth 
~t length the state immunity statutes. 
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the testimony would be incriminating under the laws of another jurisdic-· 
tion thus becomes a decisive factor in determining the constitutionality of, 
immunity statutes. Since the privilege may be invoked against the federal' 
government only when there is danger of federal prosecution, a grant of 
immunity from federal prosecution is sufficient to overcome the privilege· 
notwithstanding a real danger of state prosecution.9 The constitutional ·pro-
visions of a majority of states have been interpreted in harmony with this 
federal ruling, the courts holding that the privilege applies only when -there· 
is danger of prosecution in the state.10 Thus, as in the principal case, stat~· 
utes granting immunity from state prosecution are considered coextensive 
with the privilege. These decisions are based on the "two sovereignties"• 
theory. The federal government and the individual states are separate 
sovereignties and constitutional provisions against self-incrimination are 
enforceable only against the sovereignty whose constitution guarantees the 
privilege. Such provisions, therefore, pertain only to the protection of a 
witness from prosecution by the government whose conduct they limit.11 · 
Since the Fifth Amendment does not forbid use in a federal proceeding 
of disclosures made under the protection of a state immunity statute,12 the· 
"two sovereignties" rule presents the anomalous situation in which the 
privilege is a constitutional limitation on both the federal and state govern-
9 United States v. Murdock, 284 U.S. 141 (1931). But cf. United States v. Saline Bank, 
1 Pet. (26 U.S.) 100 (1828); Ballmann v. Fagin, 200 U.S. 186 (1906); Marcello v. United 
States, (5th Cir. 1952) 196 F. (2d) 437; United States v. Di Carlo, (N.D. Ohio 1952) 102 
F. Supp. 597, noted in 66 HARV. L. R.Ev. 186 (1952); Ullmann v. United States, 350 U.S. 
422 (1956), where the Court, while recognizing that an immunity statute must be as 
broad as the privilege, indicated that the federal statute in question granted immunity 
from state prosecution. Since state prosecution was not involved in the case, this statement 
was required only if the federal privilege also applies to danger of state prosecutions; 
otherwise (and very possibly) it was dictum. See generally Grant, "Immunity from •Com-
pulsory Self-Incrimination in a Federal System of Government," 9 TEMP. L. Q. 57, 194 
(1934-1935); Rogge, "Compelling -the Testimony of Political Deviants," 55 MICH. L. 
R.Ev. 163 (1956); 82 AL.R.. 1380 (1933). . 
10 State v. Morgan, 164 Ohio St. 529, 133 N:E. (2d) 104 (1956), noted in 41 MINN. L. 
R.Ev. 349 (1957); Cabot v. Corcoran, 332 Mass. 44, 123 N.E. (2d) 221 (1954), noted in 35 
Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 297 (1955); Republic of Greece v. Koukouras, 264 Mass. 318, 162 N.E. 
345 (1928); Koenck v. Cooney, 244 Iowa 153, 55 N.W. (2d) 269 (1952); State v. Wood, 99 
Vt. 490, 134 A. 697 (1926); Ex parte Copeland, 91 Tex. Crim. Rep. 549, 240 S.W. 314 
(1922); State v. March, 46 N.C. 526 (1854). See 59 A.L.R. 895 (1929); 2 A.L.R. (2d) 631 
(1948); 38 AL.R. (2d) 225 at 266 (1954). 
11 See note 10 supra; United States v. Murdock, note 9 supra; 8 W1GMORE, EVIDENCE, 
3d ed., §2258 (1940). 
12 Feldman v. United States, 322 U.S. 487 (1944), noted in 53 YALE L. J. 364 (1944). 
Although no authority has been found, states following the majority doctrine would 
probably apply the Feldman rationale and hold that the state privilege does not forbid 
use in a state criminal prosecution of evidence obtained under a grant of immunity in 
another jurisdiction. This result seems consistent with the "two sovereignties" theory. 
But see Clark v. State, 68 Fla. 433, 67 S. 135 (1914), holding that the state constitutional 
privilege in a jurisdiction following the minority view forbids use in ·a state court of 
testimony a bankrupt was compelled to give in a federal bankruptcy proceeding. Cf. 
State v. Drew, 110 Minn. 247, 124 N.W. 1091 (1910). See 154 A.L.R.. 994 (1945). 
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ments but a witness may nevertheless be compelled to give testimony which 
may very likely lead to his criminal prosecution. A minority of state courts 
have therefore more realistically reached the result urged by the dissenting 
judge in ,the principal case. By recognizing that the federal and state govern-
ments are but parts of one integrated governmental system, they hold that 
the privilege extends protection when there is a substantial danger of 
prosecution in other jurisdictions.18 Immunity from prosecution in the 
state alone thus becomes insufficient to overcome the privilege, and the 
witness cannot be forced to testify. The result in the principal case points 
out the dilemma confronting a witness in jurisdictions following the ma-
jority doctrine. He must either submit to a contempt proceeding in the 
state ordering the testimony or face a grave risk of prosecution in another 
jurisdiction. It would seem that where the judiciary has given the self-
incrimination privilege a narrow construction leading to this dilemma, the 
legislature should assure a witness the full protection afforded by the 
minority view. Congress, having power to grant immunity from state 
prosecution,14 has recognized the need and obviated the danger accord-
ingly.15 The states cannot reach this result by extending immunity beyond 
their boundaries.16 They could, however, follow the approach taken by 
the Illinois legislature and require a denial of immunity when the testimony 
would be incriminating elsewhere, thus permitting the witness to remain 
silent.17 
George R. Haydon, Jr. 
18 People, v. DenUyl, 318 Mich. 645, 29 N.W. (2d) 284 (1947); Commonwealth v. 
Rhine, (Ky. 1957) 303 S.W. (2d) 301, noted in 106 UNIV. PA. L. REv. 127 (1957); Lorenzo 
v. Blackburn, (Fla. 1954) 74 S. (2d) 289; State v. Kelly, (Fla. 1954) 71 S. (2d) 887; State 
ex rel. Doran v. Doran, 215 La. 151, 39 S. (2d) 894 (1949). Cf. Application of Herlands, 204 
Misc. 373, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 402 (1953); In re Amato, 204 Misc. 454, 124 N.Y.S. (2d) 726 
(1953). See State v. Dominguez, 228 La. 284, 82 S. (2d) 12 (1955), noted in 34 True. L. REv. 
639 (1956), holding the Fifth Amendment to ,be applicable in a state proceeding when 
there was danger of federal prosecution. See also Rogge, "Compelling the Testimony of 
Political Deviants," 55 MICH. L. REv. 163 at 200 (1956). 
14 Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954); Ullmann v. United States, note 9 supra. 
15 18 U.S.C. (Supp. IV, 1957) §3486. 
16 Feldman v. United States, note 12 supra. 
17 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1953) c. 38, §580a. See People v. Burkert, 7 Ill. (2d) 506, 131 N.E. 
(2d) 495 (1955). 
